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Abstract 
Qualified immunity from civil liability exists for acts of disaster mental health (DMH) practitioners 
responding to disasters or acts of terrorism. This article reviews current legal regimens dictating civil 
liability for potentially wrongful acts of DMH professionals and volunteers responding to disasters. 
Criteria are proposed to inform determinations of civil liability for DMH workers in disaster re-
sponse, given current legal parameters and established tort law in relevant areas. Specific consider-
ations are examined that potentially implicate direct liability of DMH professionals and volunteers, 
and vicarious liability of DMH supervisors for actions of volunteer subordinates. The relevance of 
pre-event DMH planning and operationalization of the plan post-event is linked to considerations 
of liability. This article concludes with recommendations to minimize liability exposure for DMH 
workers in response efforts. 
 
Despite the continuing occurrence of natural disasters and the increased possibility of 
wide-scale terrorist attacks, there is an absence of a comprehensive framework for analyz-
ing potential liability of mental health practitioners responding to disasters. This absence 
is significant considering the proliferation of federal, state, and local disaster response 
planning initiatives following the events of 9/11. Wide-scale terrorist attacks clearly result 
in physical, environmental, and economic consequences. Yet, the politically motivated ob-
jective of terrorist activities is to cause widespread psychological harm, traumatizing entire 
communities. Survivors of terrorist attacks and natural disasters exhibit a wide range of 
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psychological sequelae that can manifest either immediately or with delayed onset. Disas-
ter response planning has thus incorporated contingencies for disaster mental health de-
ployment, including the use of natural helpers as mental health volunteers when an 
adequate number of licensed professionals may be lacking. Such circumstances are partic-
ularly likely to occur in rural areas or other mental health shortage areas characterized by 
an absence of licensed mental health practitioners. In such communities, both professionals 
and natural helpers bear significant responsibilities in the mental health response. Deter-
mining liability of these disaster mental responders has thus become a critical policy issue. 
This article begins with a review of the current state of best practice proposals in the 
field of disaster mental health. Then, an examination of current liability shields that pro-
vide immunity for the actions of disaster mental health workers is outlined, including state 
emergency management statutes—the principal expression of legislative public policy re-
garding liability for disaster responders. Finally, a framework is proposed for considering 
a determination of liability for both formally trained, licensed professionals and trained, 
nonlicensed or untrained disaster mental health workers and their professional supervi-
sors in disaster response. The article concludes with suggested recommendations for effec-
tive deployment of disaster mental health resources that minimize liability exposure. 
 
The Disaster Mental Health Response 
 
Survivors of a disaster can be overcome with emotion after witnessing or experiencing 
environmental destruction, physical injuries or deaths of peers, and loss of property and 
possibly of livelihoods. Immediate reactions differ from those that are longer-term. Shock 
and anxiety may initially overwhelm an individual. Symptoms of chronic anxiety may 
materialize months later (Figley, 1985; Sprang, 2003). Both individual and circumstantial 
characteristics influence how people respond to disaster events, including variations in 
personality structure, demographic characteristics, degree of exposure to the experience, 
personal loss suffered, pre-morbid conditions, and existing mental illness as well as the 
overall extent of the catastrophe (Cohen, 1990; Cohen & Ahearn, 1980; Green, 1996; Ursano, 
Fullerton, & Norwood, 2003). Literature has specifically found a prevalence of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) among disaster survivors, and correlations between severity of 
PTSD and degree of exposure to the disaster (Foy, Sipprelle, Rueger, & Carroll, 1984; Galea 
et al., 2002; Green, 1991; Green, Grace, Lindy, Titchner, & Lindy, 1983; Halligan & Yehuda, 
2000; Shore, Tatum, & Vollmer, 1986; Smith, North, McCool, & Shea, 1990). 
Disaster mental health (DMH) work includes elements of prevention, crisis interven-
tion, screening, and treatment of trauma. DMH is integrated in all phases of disaster 
response and recovery for individuals and communities. The type and timing of the inter-
vention, and the appropriate level of training for the DMH responders involved in inter-
vention, depends upon the characteristics of the disaster event and the number and 
characteristics of survivors affected. Examples of common individual and group DMH in-
terventions include consulting with officials to insure that public communication of risk 
engenders calm rather than panic; screening adults and children for symptoms of distress; 
monitoring stress levels of disaster workers in the field; and going door to door in an af-
fected community to provide information on disaster stress (California Governor’s Office 
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of Emergency Services, 2001; Cohen, 1990; Cohen & Ahearn, 1980; DeWolfe & Nordboe, 
2000). 
Given the circumstances in which disaster response occurs, there is an absence of con-
trolled research studies focusing on the efficacy of disaster response practices. DMH inter-
ventions are thus considered to be less evidence based and more commonly viewed as 
expert or evidence informed. It has been recommended that a national set of principles and 
best practices in DMH be developed (American Psychological Association Task Force on 
the Mental Health Response to the Oklahoma City Bombing, 1997; National Advisory 
Committee on Children and Terrorism, 2003; National Institute of Mental Health, 2002). 
To date there is no single definitive guide of proven best practices for clinicians and DMH 
workers to follow. The most widely accepted set of interventions and training for disaster 
is the American Red Cross Disaster Mental Health Course (1995). The American Psycho-
logical Association and National Association of Social Workers have endorsed the Ameri-
can Red Cross model (American Psychological Association, 2004; Webb, 2000). These 
organizations encourage members involved in DMH to complete the Red Cross training 
and work within its structure following a disaster. 
The Red Cross staffs the mental health function of disaster response with licensed men-
tal health professionals only and has a flattened clinical hierarchy. There is no differentia-
tion between licensures among personnel, and the level of intervention is no higher than 
that which the lowest licensed staff member can perform. Clinical interventions commonly 
used in crisis situations or in treatment of acute stress are not taught in the Red Cross 
course. Instead, a framework for viewing and communicating the normal reactions to 
phases of disaster is emphasized. Debriefing and defusing techniques are discussed in the 
course, but a strict format for delivering the interventions is not demanded in practice. The 
course is taught in two days and relies on the ability of mental health professionals to adapt 
their existing skill set to meet the needs of people affected by disaster. The course is not 
meant to provide crisis intervention skills or specific skill sets to practitioners (American 
Red Cross, 1995). 
In the wake of 9/11, experts in disaster mental health intervention convened on October 
30–November 1, 2001, to examine research and make recommendations regarding the use 
of early psychological interventions in the first four weeks following incidents of mass vi-
olence (National Institute of Mental Health, 2002). The report generated from this confer-
ence acknowledged the lack of randomized controlled studies that definitively point 
toward best practices in DMH response. Instead, available research was reviewed and ex-
pert consensus reached on several principles related to early intervention, timing, delivery, 
and expertise required by those delivering it. Another recent example of expert or evidence 
informed recommendations that guide the field of DMH with principles for practice is the 
prepublication version of the World Health Organization guidelines for mental health and 
social interventions following population exposure to biological or chemical weapons (van 
Ommeren & Saxena, 2004). These guidelines recommend the application of a public health 
model to mental health response in the event of disaster. Early interventions in instances 
of biological or chemical exposure involve significant medical and psychiatric triage in ad-
dition to normalization of stress reactions and the provision of nonintrusive “psychologi-
cal first aid.” Though the document is specific to biological or chemical events, the 
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principles of social and mental health intervention are very similar to those of the expert 
informed practice recommendations following mass violence. 
Both the NIMH and WHO recommendations move practitioners and agencies toward 
planned use of nonlicensed personnel to augment the mental health response. They also 
recognize the need for selective application of clinical interventions as survivors progress 
through a normal response course following the event. This is a departure from traditional 
mental health practice that focuses on identification and treatment of pathology. The rec-
ommendations suggest an approach that recognizes that the vast majority of people af-
fected by a disaster will recover with assistance only from normal social networks and 
connections. According to the NIMH and WHO frameworks, applied clinical interventions 
in disaster should blend traditional practice with education and symptom normalization 
in recognition that most survivors will respond in this manner. DMH clinicians should 
focus on facilitating this normalization process while identifying the minority of individ-
uals at risk for developing maladaptive or longer term pathological response sets and in-
tervene with appropriate treatment at an early stage. Thus, the disaster mental health 
clinician or volunteer must also have adequate knowledge of clinical indicators that fall 
outside normal reactions to disaster so they can adequately screen and intervene with 
those at risk for developing longer term problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. 
 
Current Liability Shields for Crisis Responders 
 
Although a detailed review of immunity regimens for crisis response is not warranted, a 
brief outline of the most oft-cited immunity sources provides a needed background prior 
to discussion of liability for disaster mental health workers. The principal liability shields 
include the doctrine of sovereign immunity, state “Good Samaritan” statutes, and state 
disaster emergency response statutes. 
 
Sovereign Immunity 
The English doctrine of sovereign immunity was well entrenched in American law and 
finally codified in 1946 (Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946; Huffman, 1986). Following the 
cases of Dalehite v. United States (1953) and Berkovitz v. United States (1988), application of 
the largest liability shield for the government—the discretionary function exemption—
turned on whether or not the government entity’s act or omission was based on consider-
ations of public policy. A finding that the government discretionary action at issue is based 
on public policy immunizes the government from tort suits in order to prevent excessive 
judicial review of executive or legislative action. Subsequent cases, such as In re Ohio River 
Disaster Litigation (1988), Kennewick Irrigation District v. United States (1989), Flynn v. United 
States (1990), Lockett v. United States (1990), and Myers v. United States (1994)—all involving 
accidents or environmental disasters—further developed the discretionary function ex-
emption by focusing on factual circumstances related to the government entities’ activities 
preceding or in response to hazardous events. Notably, In re Ohio River Disaster Litigation 
accorded the government with a wide breadth of immunity from liability, if the govern-
ment acted with policy discretion, even if its activities could be deemed negligent. Other 
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decisions, such as that in Myers and Kennewick, have recognized a distinction in govern-
ment activity, in which consequences of decisions based on public policy would be 
shielded from liability, but responsibility for the consequences of decisions based on the 
lack of appropriate professional and technological judgment would not. 
Distinguishing between soundness in discretionary actions based on public policy ver-
sus technical or professional conduct is a complex factual question for courts, particularly 
when it focuses on emergency response. Lerner’s review of cases involving alleged negli-
gence by firefighters demonstrates the varied approaches state courts have adopted (1991). 
In suits for alleged negligent firefighting resulting in unnecessary property loss, some 
courts have abandoned the distinction and immunized fire departments from liability by 
recognizing technical judgment as an exercise of discretion essential to the function of 
fighting fires. Both City of Daytona Beach v. Palmer (1985) and Ayres v. Indian Heights Volun-
teer Fire Department (1986) demonstrate state courts’ deference to the professional and tech-
nical judgment of firefighters in combating fires—immunizing them from resulting 
property loss occurring after plans went awry. In contrast, other courts have distinguished 
between the technical judgments made by fire fighters—shielded from liability—and 
clearly negligent behavior involving intoxicated fire fighters or an inadequate firefighting 
response due to missing personnel—behavior which was not immunized from liability be-
cause it did not involve the exercise of professional discretion (Gordon v. City of Henderson, 
1989; Lerner, 1991). Similar considerations exist in emergency law enforcement response. 
In the case of a plane hijacking, for example, the Sixth Circuit found that the actions of a 
Federal Bureau of Intelligence were not covered by the discretionary function immunity 
when they resulted in the deaths of hijacked passengers (Downs v. United States, 1975). The 
FBI officer had failed to comply with standard bureau procedures regarding hostage 
safety, and therefore his actions did not further official policy (Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, & 
Owen, 1984; Kellmann, 2002). 
 
Good Samaritan Laws 
The difficulty facing courts in reviewing factual and technical circumstances of emergency 
response has been addressed at the statutory level by the passage of “Good Samaritan” 
laws that bypass tort litigation relating to negligent emergency medical response. This de-
velopment recognizes that courts are not adequately suited to review such highly technical 
scenarios and acknowledges a public policy preference to encourage private individuals 
to provide emergency medical care in good faith without fear of tort law suits. These stat-
utes typically provide immunity for treatment in which (A) care is rendered gratuitously; 
(B) care is rendered in good faith; (C) care is rendered in direct response to emergency 
medical conditions; and (D) the acts or omissions of the care giver do not amount to gross 
negligence or further culpability (Reuter, 1999; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 17-95-101, 
WESTLAW through 2003 Second Extraordinary Sess.; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12B, 
2003; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1501 sec.1(1), WESTLAW through 2004; Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 537.037(1)-(2), WESTLAW through 2004 Second Reg. Sess.; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
4.24.300, WESTLAW through 2004). 
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State Emergency Management Statutes 
Recognizing that the occurrence of disasters may result in wide-scale disorder and diffi-
culties in immediate response, states have passed emergency management statutes that 
provide wide berths of immunity for state actors and their agents or political subdivisions. 
State actors have a wide degree of discretion to exercise police powers that typically in-
clude suspending state regulations, commandeering private property, directing evacua-
tions, and prohibiting private commerce (Swanson, 2000). Immunity typically extends to 
both state agents and volunteer responders working within the scope of their duties and 
in furtherance of disaster response for actions resulting in property damage or personal 
injury including death, with the exception of acts or omissions that constitute gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct (see, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-9-16, 2003; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-829.55, 
2003; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 683.14, 2003). Some statutes provide further immunity by allowing 
liability exposure only for acts constituting willful misconduct committed by particular 
classes (see, e.g., Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 8655–8660, 2003; Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.411, 2003). 
Cases have been litigated involving state emergency management statutes over immunity 
and establishment of duties to plaintiffs (Lawry v. County of Sarpy, 1998; Sharp v. Town of 
Highland, 1996). In the case of Stinson v. City of Lincoln (2000), the Nebraska Court of Ap-
peals addressed injuries caused by a city snow plow during a blizzard. The city sought the 
protection of Nebraska’s emergency management act immunity provision, but because the 
mayor had improperly filed a declaration of emergency the statute was inapplicable. Stin-
son reflects the importance of government entities adhering to emergency management act 
procedures for them to apply. 
 
Proposing Criteria for Determining Liability for Professional and Volunteer Disaster 
Mental Health Practitioners 
 
The framework for determining professional negligence is well established in American 
tort law. The essential elements include (A) creation of a duty of care; (B) breach of that 
duty through a professional’s act or omission; (C) injury sustained to the victim; and (D) 
cause of the injury due to the professional’s act or omission. Plaintiffs in professional neg-
ligence cases must establish the applicable standard of care and prove that the defendant’s 
act or omission fell short of this standard and caused the alleged injury (Lama v. Borras, 
1994). Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island (1928) grounded negli-
gence in the reasonable person’s ability to foresee that her act or omission could injure a 
plaintiff. Justice Andrews’ dissenting opinion, however, shifted the focus from the negli-
gent actor to the negligent act and its public policy considerations. 
This dichotomy continues to permeate legal analysis of alleged negligence, as courts 
have included public policy concerns in negligence actions (Keeton et al., 1984). For exam-
ple, in Lester v. Hall (1998), the New Mexico Supreme Court found that a psychiatrist owed 
no duty to a third party injured by his patient after increasing a prescribed dosage of lith-
ium. Imposing such a duty implicated policy concerns affecting a physician’s willingness 
to prescribe medication to patients, and the burden of weighing potential effects of forcing 
physicians to balance duties of treatment owed to patients against unknown third parties. 
Similar to Lester, other state supreme courts have relied on public policy considerations in 
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negligence cases, particularly in physician duty to third party claims (Kirk v. Michael Reese 
Hospital, 1987; Praesel v. Johnson, 1998; Webb v. Jarvis, 1991). 
We believe that both established principles of tort law and policy considerations should 
provide guidance in examining claims of alleged liability against DMH workers. Our pro-
posal is necessarily mindful that public policy is principally a legislative assignment and 
that statutory intent should provide a basis for jurisprudential analysis. Given the unique 
nature of disasters and mental health disaster response, we propose that courts adopt a 
dynamic model of analysis in which traditional negligence theories and policy concerns 
are informed with considerations specific to disaster mental health response. This frame-
work includes potential liability considerations for acts or omissions of both licensed DMH 
professionals, and nonlicensed DMH volunteers and the clinicians supervising them. 
 
Acts or Omissions of Licensed DMH Professionals 
Unlike typical medical malpractice scenarios involving diagnoses and treatment of physi-
cal conditions, the mental health context obligates professionals with a variety of excep-
tional responsibilities. Such commonly cited obligations include the duty to evaluate, duty 
to commit, duty to protect patients from themselves, and duty to protect third parties from 
patients (Commonwealth v. Nassar, 1980; Furrow, Greaney, Johnson, Jost, & Schwartz, 1995; 
Hill v. County Board of Mental Health, 1979; Isele, 1975; Leedy v. Hartnett, 1981; Mayock v. 
Martin, 1968; Nicholi, 1988; Reisner, Slobogin, & Rai, 2004; Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 1976). The application of the negligence framework in determining poten-
tial liability for mental health professionals poses clear challenges. This is due in part to 
the prevalence of multiple schools of thought in psychiatric care, and the profession’s gen-
eral practice of approaching each patient’s disorders with a personally tailored treatment 
regimen. In addition, the stigma of mental illness may discourage individuals from report-
ing, or lead to under-reporting, the degree of symptoms suffered (Fishalow, 1975; Furrow, 
1980; Shuman, 1993; Simon, 1987; Simon & Sadoff, 1992). 
A number of potentially problematic issues arise in this context. DMH workers maintain 
a significant advantage over survivors who may be traumatized and seeking emotional 
intimacy, creating more potential for sexual indiscretion and other abuses. Establishing 
and terminating individual treatment relationships is difficult to discern in post-disaster 
environments that are characterized by an abundance of survivors and a minimum of 
DMH workers. Provision of traditionally recognized forms of informed consent may be 
lacking or absent. 
Current disaster-specific mental health response practices encourage DMH workers to 
talk and listen to survivors and response workers while developing a normalizing atmos-
phere. DMH workers offer water, sunscreen, and suggestions for stress management, ra-
ther than explicitly discussing emotions or symptoms (Weaver, 1995). DMH clinicians 
concurrently screen and assess individuals for potential problems, but typically identify 
themselves only as disaster workers or emergency volunteers when approaching or work-
ing with survivors or emergency workers. There is a widely held belief among DMH work-
ers that hiding their labeled role of “mental health” will minimize stigma and create an 
environment that encourages sharing of experiences. This position is actually contrary to 
a recommendation from the American Psychological Association that DMH professionals 
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self-identify in the field (American Psychological Association Task Force on the Mental 
Health Response to the Oklahoma City Bombing, 1997). Three reasons were cited for read-
ily identifying DMH workers. First, the actual effect of not identifying as a DMH practi-
tioner may increase rather than decrease the stigma associated with getting help. Second, 
recipients of DMH service have an ethical right to know who they are talking to so they 
have the opportunity to decline service. Third, those who desire DMH service should be 
able to readily identify who to approach for assistance if it is desired. To date these recom-
mendations have not been incorporated as a regular part of the American Red Cross DMH 
training. 
 
Informed Consent 
Providing informed consent for DMH interventions is made difficult by the lack of  
evidence-based practices available to clinicians and nonlicensed DMH workers. As DMH 
interventions become less acceptable from the standpoint of professionally accepted stand-
ards, provision of informed consent becomes more important. For example, one interven-
tion questioned in the National Institute of Mental Health report on early interventions 
following mass violence (2002b) was critical incident stress debriefing (CISD). Popularized 
by Mitchell and Everly as part of a set of interventions called Critical Incident Stress Man-
agement (Everly Jr., Flannery, & Eyler, 2002; Mitchell, 2003, 2004), CISD is a widely ac-
cepted systematic group intervention used with emergency response and military 
personnel following a traumatic event to decrease risk of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) (Baker, 1996; Budd, 1997; Fitzgerald et al., 1993). Questions about the efficacy of 
CISD have arisen as research has indicated that it may actually be positively associated 
with PTSD (Arendt & Elklit, 2001; Lewis, 2003). The lack of evidence that CISD prevents 
PTSD may be offset by other research indicating that the debriefing process promotes 
group cohesion, a sense of normalcy, and self-reporting by participants of positive feelings 
about participating in the process (Budd, 1997; Shalev, Rogel-Fuchs, Ursano, &Marlowe, 
1998). This inconsistency in findings has resulted in mixed endorsements of CISD by dis-
aster response organizations. Although variations of debriefing that depart from CISD are 
still recommended, it is also recommended that the risks and benefits of participating in 
CISD and its alternatives be disclosed when obtaining informed consent (National Institute 
of Mental Health, 2002; Waits, 2002). 
The use of CISD in group disaster treatment would be one such treatment that would 
obligate obtainment of informed consent (Litz, 2004). For DMH interventions in general, 
workers should be prepared to communicate the known risks and benefits of participating 
in the intervention based on expert and evidence-informed information. In the post-disas-
ter environment, DMH workers may either not initiate a process of obtaining informed 
consent, or survivors may be unable to provide informed consent given a temporary ab-
sence of competency (Hampton, 1985). Nonetheless, it should be incumbent upon DMH 
workers to communicate the risks and benefits of treatment to survivors when establishing 
a treatment relationship. If the risks and benefits of an intervention are unknown or de-
bated, DMH workers should disclose this to survivors prior to initiating the treatment at 
issue. Further research is needed to identify uniform, accepted standards for obtaining in-
formed consent in disaster settings. 
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Causation of Harm 
Because DMH intervention is primarily verbal, it is difficult to identify causation between 
negligent acts or omissions and actual harm than for forms of nonverbal treatment such as 
prescription of medication. Additionally, psychological harm experienced by a disaster 
survivor may be a result of a DMH worker’s act or omission, the trauma of the event, or a 
combination of both. For example, the suicide of a disaster survivor with a known history 
of depression and suicide may initially point to some level of negligence by the DMH cli-
nician who screened/assessed the person in the field. However, this is tempered by the 
amount of stress and trauma experienced by the individual as a result of just being exposed 
to the disaster event. The foreseeability of suicide, and degree to which the DMH clinician 
monitored and evaluated the survivor for suicide risk and made appropriate interventions, 
would inform judicial review of a claim for failing to prevent suicide (Baerger, 2001; Bates 
v. Denny, 1990; Dinnerstein v. United States, 1973; Kockelman v. Segal, 1998; Rudolph v. Lindsay, 
1993). Courts have previously relied on a rigorous variation of gross negligence that rises 
to a level of “deliberate indifference” to find entities liable for prevention of suicide or 
harm to third parties. Liability based on deliberate indifference commonly occurs in pris-
ons, schools, or other controlled environments where employees had clear knowledge that 
harm would occur as a result of an act or omission (Fossey & Zirkel, 2004; Giller, 2004; 
Lucero & Bernhardt, 2002). The uncontrolled field environment and initial disorder fol-
lowing a disaster in which clinical assessment and monitoring for self-harm or harm to 
third parties would occur should mediate against exposure to liability, as opposed to a 
controlled in-patient setting where monitoring and evaluation would be easier to conduct 
(Simon & Sadoff, 1992). 
The degree to which evidence-based, evidence-informed, or expert-informed data exists 
about interventions used by DMH workers should be assessed in any determination of 
liability for acts or omissions in the field. Standards of care established through literature, 
peer conferences, and clinical practice protocols should weigh into the analysis. Practices 
deemed well accepted should provoke less judicial scrutiny than those which are not. A 
practice deemed to be part of a school of thought constituting a respectable minority of 
opinion may warrant greater scrutiny. Actions considered grossly negligent and a viola-
tion of reasonable standards of duty should elicit stricter judicial scrutiny and potential 
liability exposure. Beyond failure to prevent suicide scenarios, other examples might in-
clude grossly negligent acts performed while intoxicated, and other conduct that cannot 
be reasonably interpreted as professional or in furtherance of disaster response (Furrow et 
al., 1995; Keeton et al., 1984). It must be noted that a DMH professional’s conduct must rise 
at least to a level of gross negligence in order to lose statutory immunity from emergency 
management laws, if not greater degrees of culpability. 
As opposed to inadequate assessment or treatment or other forms of gross negligence, 
a stronger case for provoking strict judicial scrutiny would involve instances of positive 
willful misconduct that violate professional guidelines. Unwanted sexual battery and/or 
other forms of exploitation of survivors might warrant such a finding. Examples might 
include gathering personal data for financial gain, engaging in criminal activity, aiding or 
abetting a survivor to commit criminal activity, or engaging in unethical or professionally 
unacceptable therapeutic practices (Burgess, 1981; Furrow et al., 1995; Keeton et al., 1984; 
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Simon, 1989; Simon & Sadoff, 1992). Such conduct would also not be covered by state emer-
gency management statute immunity as it amounts to willful misconduct and does not 
further effective disaster response or reasonable attempts to comply with disaster response 
goals. 
The framework for viewing acts and omissions of DMH licensed and nonlicensed work-
ers in the field can be conceptualized as a continuum (see table 1). 
 
Table 1. Factors informing liability exposure for acts or omissions of DMH workers 
 Less liability exposure Greater liability exposure  
 DMH worker’s act or omission comports with 
well accepted professional practices supported by 
evidence-based research. 
 DMH worker’s act or omission amounts to fur-
therance of effective disaster response or good 
faith attempt to further effective disaster response. 
 Informed consent is obtained. 
 DMH worker’s act or omission amounts to willful 
misconduct that does not further goal of effective 
disaster response (e.g., sexual battery, criminal ac-
tivity). 
 DMH worker’s act or omission amounts to gross 
negligence or deliberate indifference in failure to 
diagnose and treat survivor and causes foresee-
able injury (e.g., commission of suicide or harm 
incurred to third parties). 
 DMH worker’s act or omission is not a well- 
accepted professional practice and/or evidence-
based or evidence-informed research indicates 
potential for aggravation of injury (e.g., CISD). 
 Informed consent is not obtained. 
 
Acts or Omissions of Nonlicensed DMH Workers 
Nonlicensed personnel may augment the planned disaster mental health response in a 
community. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Crisis Counseling Program 
recommends deployment of both mental health professionals and indigenous workers 
who understand the culture of the community they are working in (DeWolfe & Nordboe, 
2000). These indigenous workers may include human service workers, school personnel, 
clergy and other faith leaders, or other natural helpers in the community. Such volunteers 
may already have developed positions of authority and social relationships within com-
munities that can facilitate effective response following the occurrence of a disaster. The 
National Institute of Mental Health (2002) recognizes that these DMH workers, often vol-
unteers, are crucial in places with few licensed professionals, such as rural areas or mental 
health shortage areas. Although not formally trained to independently deliver profes-
sional-level service, DMH volunteers can provide basic forms of screening and referral, 
assist survivors with basic needs, provide comfort, and help calm the overall situation (Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, 2002a). However, involvement of these nonlicensed 
DMH workers also poses liability problems because of their lack of formal professional 
and ethical training. Previously established positions of authority and relationships can 
also potentially increase the risk of malfeasance (Israel, 1985; Kelley & Kelley, 1985; Patter-
son, Germain, Brennan, & Memmott, 1988; Patterson, Memmott, Brennan, & Germain, 
1992; Timpson, 1983; Vallance & D’Augelli, 1982). 
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In recognition that volunteers pay a crucial role in disaster response, state emergency 
management acts provide the same liability shields to volunteers as they do to state offi-
cials and professionals responding to disastrous events (Ala. Code § 31-9-16, 2003; Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 81-829.55, 2003; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 683.14, 2003). Acts or omissions amounting 
to gross negligence or willful misconduct that would exclude the professional DMH 
worker from statutory immunity would similarly apply to the nonlicensed DMH worker. 
However, the wrongful actions of nonlicensed DMH workers might implicate liability for 
licensed professionals who supervise the nonlicensed volunteer or worker. 
 
Liability of the Licensed DMH Clinical Supervisor 
Two theories of liability might be pursued in the context of supervising DMH workers. A 
DMH professional might be directly liable, if it can be shown that the professional was 
grossly negligent in failing to supervise the workers when there is clear evidence that 
professional-level therapeutic intervention is necessary. For instance, a DMH professional 
who deliberately ignores communications from a supervisee about a survivor’s symptoms 
could create potential liability exposure if that information should prompt a reasonable 
DMH professional to personally intervene. This would occur if the lack of intervention 
could be construed as gross negligence or deliberate indifference. 
As opposed to direct liability, a DMH supervisor might be held vicariously liable for the 
actions of a supervised volunteer. The imposition of vicarious liability is principally a de-
cision based on public policy considerations to allocate risk from supervised individuals 
to supervising employers. For such a finding to exist, the first critical inquiry to be deter-
mined is whether or not an employment-like relationship existed between the DMH pro-
fessional and volunteer. This could be demonstrated by a right to control or supervise the 
DMH worker, or documents that would color such a relationship with authority, such as 
previously drawn contracts, memorandums of understanding, and written plans or proto-
cols. A plan denoting that a local church’s clergy should work under and with trained 
professionals in DMH response might indicate that such a relationship exists. 
The other consideration is whether or not the supervisee was working within the scope 
of employment while the alleged act occurred. In the DMH response context, this should 
include a factual inquiry reviewing the intention of the supervisee to further effective dis-
aster response and whether a reasonable supervisor could foresee a wrongful act or omis-
sion by the supervisee in this endeavor. The supervisee’s culpability behind the act or 
omissions, the professional’s ability to control the supervisee, and the circumstances in 
which the supervisee was acting are also important. Willful misconduct and intentional 
torts by the supervisee, such as commission of sexual battery, may impute liability to the 
supervisee. Determining whether willful misconduct of an employee can be vicariously 
attributed to employers depends on jurisdiction case law regarding the alleged activity 
(Keeton et al., 1984; Saccuzzo, 1997). For example, in Simmons v. U.S. (1986), the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that sexual battery initiated by a counselor arose out of the provision of therapy, 
and consequently fell within the scope of employment and imputed vicarious liability to 
the counselor’s government employer. However, in P.S. v. Psychiatric Coverage, Ltd. (1994), 
the Missouri Court of Appeals overturned a trial court’s judgment that an employer was 
vicariously liable for a therapist’s sexual battery. Even though sexual acts were committed 
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during therapy sessions, the court held that the acts were not part of a legitimate therapy 
program and that they were the result of purely individual motivations. 
A crucial factor implicating the DMH supervisor’s potential vicarious liability exposure 
is the extent to which the professional had actual control over the DMH worker’s actions. 
The degree of communication between the DMH supervisor and worker in the field about 
worker activities and the degree to which the supervisor personally monitored and evalu-
ated the conduct of workers in the field are key elements informing an analysis of whether 
or not control exists (Allen, 2003; Clark, 1997) (see table 2). In the post-disaster environ-
ment, maintaining this degree of control or good faith attempts at maintaining control 
might be difficult, depending on the severity of the disaster event and number of available 
licensed supervisors and DMH workers. The American Psychological Association recom-
mends that inexperienced licensed professionals, unlicensed mental health workers, and 
paraprofessionals be supervised by licensed personnel with DMH experience. It is further 
noted that a clear and precise line of supervision should be in place and that all DMH 
workers have knowledge and understanding of chain of command concepts (American 
Psychological Association Task Force on the Mental Health Response to the Oklahoma 
City Bombing, 1997). 
 
Table 2. Factors informing liability exposure of DMH professionals for conduct of DMH volunteers 
 Less liability exposure Greater liability exposure  
 Direct liability: DMH professional’s act or omis-
sion comports with well-accepted professional 
practices of supervising volunteers. 
 Vicarious liability: DMH professional does not 
have effective control over DMH volunteer’s con-
duct. 
 Direct liability: DMH professional is directly lia-
ble for being grossly negligent in supervising act 
or omission of DMH. 
 Vicarious liability: DMH professional is vicari-
ously liable for grossly negligent conduct of su-
pervised volunteer if professional has effective 
control over DMH volunteer. 
 
Liability Associated with DMH Plans and Implementation 
A number of professional, private, and public entities have developed plans specific to 
DMH response. Plan elements cover deployment and coordination of interstate, state, and 
local resources; recommended clinical practices; and frameworks for integrating nonli-
censed DMH workers under professional umbrellas (see, e.g., DeWolfe & Nordboe, 2000; 
Ehrenreich & McQuaide, 2001; Myers, 1994; Young, Ford, Ruzek, Friedman, & Gusman, 
2001). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has recommended guidelines 
for the development of state DMH response and recovery plans that include considerations 
for role assignment, communication, conveyance of public information, and resource man-
agement (Flynn, 2003). 
Although the principal factors in determining liability for DMH workers should focus 
on individual acts or omissions and causation of harm, plan characteristics and degree of 
deviance from plans in their actual operationalization should inform judicial review of in-
dividual responsibility for alleged wrongful acts. Lerner (1991) distinguished between cir-
cumstances in which response planning was either negligently drafted or properly drafted 
but negligently followed. Noting the sparseness in legal precedent specifically addressing 
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liability implications flowing from this distinction, he recommended that response plan 
drafting incorporate due consideration of how specific the response guidelines are and the 
degree to which response activities are defined as either mandatory or discretionary (Ler-
ner, 1991). Proving gross negligence in plan drafting could be argued on considerations of 
the foreseeability of post-disaster needs and how adequately these needs are addressed by 
plan drafters. Plaintiffs could assert a claim alleging gross negligence in plan drafting by 
failing to adequately prepare for post-disaster contingencies that are abundantly docu-
mented in evidence-based or evidence/expert-informed research (see table 3). For example, 
a plan that fails to provide for any post-disaster DMH mobilization for the possibility of 
addressing treatment needs of survivors at risk for PTSD could be deemed grossly negli-
gent because an abundance of literature indicates that incidence of PTSD has been docu-
mented among disaster survivors (Foy et al., 1984; Galea et al., 2002; Green, 1991; Green et 
al., 1983; Smith et al., 1990). 
 
Table 3. Plan drafting and operationalization 
 Less liability exposure Greater liability exposure  
 Conduct of DMH workers deviating from ade-
quately drafted plan amounts to good faith at-
tempts that further professionally accepted 
practices of DMH response. 
 Conduct of DMH workers deviating from ade-
quately drafted plan amounts to gross negligence 
or willful misconduct that does not further pro-
fessionally accepted practices of DMH response. 
 
However, we believe that claims for gross negligence in plan drafting would be found 
unsuccessful if adjudicated. Attention to statutory text authorizing plan creation would be 
the critical focus of such a determination. For example, under Nebraska’s emergency man-
agement statute, the legislature requires the executive to create a disaster response plan 
and makes recommendations for substantive elements to be addressed. However, it af-
fords a wide degree of discretion in plan substance by not mandating the inclusion of any 
of its recommendations (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-829.41, 2003). Discretionary acts or omissions 
furthering public safety concerns as a matter of policy would be shielded under discretion-
ary exemption immunity, and legislatures traditionally enjoy near absolute immunity from 
civil liability (Keeton et al., 1984). The stated purpose of Nebraska’s act is to reduce vul-
nerability of harm preceding or following a disaster and provide for cooperation and co-
ordination of response activities. However, nothing in Nebraska’s act, or those of other 
states, expressly guarantees that no harm will occur as a result of disaster response plan-
ning or operationalization (Ala. Code § 31-9, 2003; Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.401, 2003; Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 81-829.55, 2003; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 683, 2003). Such a guarantee would amount 
to the imposition of strict liability upon state executive entities for the occurrence of any 
harm caused through disaster response activity. Nebraska’s act provides qualified immun-
ity for the state, its political subdivisions, and emergency management workers except in 
cases of gross negligence, bad faith, and willful misconduct (Lawry v. County of Sarpy, 1998; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-829.55, 2003). 
Claims of tort liability would thus not focus on the DMH plan itself but on acts or omis-
sions committed in implementation of plans in the field. Such claims should turn on the 
degree of individual culpability behind the act or omission itself and not the degree to 
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which deviance from the plan occurs. The existence of explicit guidelines in disaster plan-
ning which outline acceptable and ethical field practices based on professional standards 
of conduct could thus serve as an additional criterion to be determined in findings of al-
leged liability, but should not in itself serve as an absolute criterion determining liability. 
 
Recommendations 
 
DMH workers (both licensed and nonlicensed) should consider the following general rec-
ommendations to limit potential liability when serving in the field as part of a disaster 
mental health response. 
1) Incorporate the use of informed consent in the delivery of DMH interventions. This 
can be accomplished through verbal or written disclosure of the known efficacy 
and risks at the onset of more formal interventions (e.g., debriefing), or by having 
the clinician disclose when a specific intervention may be used (e.g., cognitive be-
havioral therapy in the field) prior to actual treatment delivery. Disclosure is par-
ticularly recommended if the risks and benefits of participating in a treatment are 
unknown. 
2) Clearly identify your DMH profession or role in the field. It is unethical to hide 
your affiliation and true purpose in the response. The right to refuse intervention 
is obscured when the DMH worker is “disguised.” Introduce yourself as a psy-
chologist, social worker, chaplain, or mental health worker— not as an “escort” or 
“worker” or other generic term that does not reflect your role, licensure or qualifi-
cations. 
3) Insist on adequate supervision of DMH workers by trained, licensed professionals. 
Supervisors should likewise insist on manageably sized groups of workers to su-
pervise. This ratio may be dictated by a number of factors including the nature of 
the disaster and characteristics of the workforce. Appropriate mechanisms should 
be established for timely monitoring and evaluation of DMH worker conduct. 
4) Become involved in DMH response planning efforts to create administrative struc-
tures that reflect known and evolving best practices. Make an effort to understand 
the DMH plan and the parameters for practice it contains. 
5) DMH workers operating outside of formal structures such as the American Red 
Cross should be subject to emergency management organizing structures using in-
cident management systems that identify a clear chain of command, inclusive of 
DMH personnel. Lines of communication within DMH ranks with supervisory au-
thority should be clearly delineated within the overall disaster response. DMH pro-
fessionals and volunteers should be exposed to incident management system 
training prior to deployment in disaster response. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through the passage of emergency management acts, state legislatures have indicated a 
policy preference encouraging individuals to assist in disaster response without fear of 
being subject to civil actions. Convincing mental health professionals and others to serve 
as part of a disaster response team is much easier if liability issues are adequately ad-
dressed. The field of disaster mental health is evolving as we learn more about people’s 
reactions to different types or phases of disaster and how to effectively address them. 
The functional role of the DMH practitioner is often secondary to that of the traditional 
clinician, clergy-member, teacher, case worker, or other day-to-day worker. Thus, DMH 
work is less familiar and less practiced by those who assume it. The issue of liability is 
particularly pertinent in the field of disaster mental health because of the high number of 
individuals volunteering for this role, the low number of proven efficacious DMH inter-
ventions, and relative paucity of legal tests directly related to the field. The framework 
presented in this article sets forth a possible framework to view liability exposure that is 
understandable to the clinicians and practitioners who must assume it. The recommenda-
tions are practical and hopefully pertinent to planners and practitioners alike. When the 
next disaster occurs and a DMH response is needed, those who serve should be afforded 
adequate protection from liability through appropriate administrative structures, proper 
supervision, and personal knowledge of ethical, effective practices. 
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